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Choice of law litigation often involves large corporations,' because cor-
porate activity frequently implicates the laws of several states. In theory,
choice of law rules apply indiscriminately to persons and corporations.2
The modern interest analysis approach to choice of law,3 however, at-
1. The large, multi-state corporation serves as the working paradigm of this Note. This Note's
critique of interest analysis in the corporate context will not apply to purely domestic corporations,
which, by the nature of their activity, are usually not involved in choice of law litigation.
2. More specifically, the same choice of law rules that govern personal affairs also govern the
external affairs of a corporation, such as contracts, asset transfers, and torts. RESTATEMENT (SECoND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 301 (1971) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)] ("rights and liabilities of
a corporation with respect to a third person that arise from a corporate act of a sort that can likewise
be done by an individual are determined by the same choice-of-law principles as are applicable to
non-corporate parties"); Reese & Kaufman, The Law Governing Corporate Affairs: Choice of Law
and the Impact of Full Faith and Credit, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 1118, 1120 (1958).
The internal affairs of a corporation, which include corporate organization and structure as well as
the relationship between shareholders and managers, are governed by the law of the place of incorpo-
ration. See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 621
(1983); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra, at § 302. See generally Kozyris, Corporate Wars and
Choice of Law, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1 (extensive discussion of internal affairs doctrine).
3. American choice of law doctrine has undergone a well-noted transformation in the past thirty
years. The traditional vested rights approach has been replaced in many states by one of a variety of
modern methods. See generally E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 2.4- .17 (1982) (outlin-
ing history of recent choice of law revolution). The traditional approach, embodied in the RESTATE-
MENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 377-90 (1934) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT], generally applies the
law of the place where the legal right in question vests. See L. BRILMAYER, AN INTRODUCTION TO
JURISDICTION IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 218-21 (1986). Modem theories have developed along two
general lines: the Second Restatement's "most significant relationship" test, discussed infra notes 7 &
77; and interest analysis, the focus of this Note, which is explained in detail, infra notes 6-26 and
accompanying text.
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tempts to assimilate corporations into a framework suited to individuals
that fails to account for the special nature of corporate entities in reaching
choice of law solutions.4 Consequently, although interest analysis seems
neutral in application to corporations and persons, it actually operates to
produce untoward results in the corporate context.
This Note argues that interest analysis cannot be applied to corpora-
tions in a principled manner.5 Section I explores the domicile-based
presuppositions at the heart of interest analysis. Because interest analysis
ascertains protective state interests on the basis of domicile, and because
corporate contacts with a state do not translate well into domiciliary sta-
tus, interest analysis fails to recognize important state interests in protect-
ing corporations. Section II identifies the types of corporate contacts that
should implicate the protection of state laws, and documents the variety of
ways that interest analysis courts have undervalued these contacts in de-
termining the "appropriate" array of state interests. While Section II im-
plicitly develops a model of how interest analysis would have to operate in
order to be fair to corporations, it does not suggest that interest analysis
can coherently accommodate corporations. For as Section III shows, the
inclusion of corporations in the interest calculus leads to unresolvable dif-
ficulties. Moreover, interest analysis as currently practiced allows extrane-
ous anti-corporate factors to influence the purportedly neutral evaluation
of state interests.
4. A nascent but growing literature details the pernicious effects of treating corporations like per-
sons in the eyes of the law, and suggests a more entity-specific approach. See M. DAN-COHEN,
RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL THEORY FOR BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY (1986);
0. STIONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR (1975); see
also Stewart, Organizational Jurisprudence (Book Review), 101 HARV. L. REV. 371 (1987) (review-
ing Dan-Cohen's book and outlining various theories of organization). These scholars argue that the
law frequently breaks down when applied to corporations because it inevitably fails to assimilate
corporations into pre-existing individualistic legal structures. See M. DAN-COHEN, supra, at 5. The
most prominent branch of organization theory focuses on corporate rights and responsibilities. See,
e.g., C. STONE, supra; Coffee, "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry
into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MicH. L. REv. 386 (1981); Kraakman, Gatekeepers:
The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986). These com-
mentators believe that the distinctive organizational features of corporations must be considered in
designing legal controls for corporate conduct.
This Note builds on the perception by organization theorists of "the need to correct the law's
prevailing disregard of the unique characteristics of organizations." Stewart, supra, at 373. However,
this Note focuses not on corporate responsibility, but rather on the manner in which the application of
a seemingly neutral choice of law system treats corporations inequitably.
5. This Note specifically critiques interest analysis as applied to corporations in tort and tort-
related contexts. It emphasizes tort law because (1) interest analysis has most frequently replaced the
traditional approach in the tort context, see T. DE BOEsR, BEYOND LEX Loci DELICrI 10 (1987);
Juenger, Conflict of Laws: A Critique of Interest Analysis, 32 AM. J. Comp. L. 1, 12 (1984) therein-
after Juenger, Conflict of Laws]; and (2) most judicial decisions and academic discussions concerning
interest analysis focus on torts, see Juenger, What Now?, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 509, 514 (1985). Because
tort and tort-related laws vary from state to state, the choice of law determination is crucial to the
outcome of a case.
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I. THE INTEREST ANALYSIS BIAS AGAINST RECOGNITION OF STATE
INTERESTS IN CORPORATIONS
Interest analysis subsumes a variety of related choice of law tech-
niques.8 These methods differ more in name than in substance, however,
especially when contrasted with the traditional learning. Each method
generally provides that a court faced with a choice of law problem should
initially look to the policies expressed in the purportedly conflicting state
laws in order to assess the extent of each state's interest7 in having its law
apply to the particular case." Additionally, each method agrees on the pro-
cess for identifying and resolving false conflicts.' Agreement collapses,
however, concerning how courts should resolve true conflicts.'
6. Corr, Interest Analysis and Choice of Law: The Dubious Dominance of Domicile, 1983 UTAH
L. REv. 651, 653 n.10; Reppy, Eclecticism in Choice of Law: Hybrid Method or Mishmash?, 34
MERCER L. RE%,. 645, 647 (1983). These related techniques all grow out of the seminal work of
Brainerd Currie. See generally B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFucT OF LAWS (1963).
7. Several authors have attacked the interest analysis conception of state interests. See, e.g.,
Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MIcH. L. REv. 392 (1980) (at-
tacking theory that "interests" reflect legislative will); Ely, Choice of Law and the State's Interest in
Protecting Its Own, 23 WM. & MARY L. REv. 173 (1981) (attacking interest analysis' protect-the-
locals orientation). This Note does not critique the interest analysis concept of state interests directly.
Rather, it reads "interests" sympathetically in order to illustrate the unprincipled application of the
concept to corporations. Generalizations about interest analysis must be made carefully, because courts
frequently add their own variations and employ several choice of law methods, or combinations of
different methods, in reaching their conclusions. See Reppy, supra note 6 (attacking "eclectic" ap-
proach in modern choice of law). Moreover, "[c]ourts have shown a distinct inability to distinguish
[different choice of law theories and] . .. often say they are using one theory when their opinions
clearly show that they are using another." Smith, Choice of Law in the United States, 38 HASTINGS
L.J. 1041, 1042 (1987). This Note will focus on what courts actually do rather than on what they say
they are doing, and will consider as an example of interest analysis any case in which courts reach
their conclusions through the identification and consideration of state interests.
The Second Restatement's "most significant relationship" test, see REsTATEMENT (SECOND), supra
note 2, at § 145, presents special methodological difficulties when discussing interest analysis because
courts often purport to invoke it while actually performing interest analysis, see, e.g., Murphy v.
Colorado Aviation, 41 Colo. App. 237, 242, 588 P.2d 877, 880 (1978), or use it to break true conflicts
in the course of an interest analysis, see, e.g., Griggs v. Riley, 489 S.W.2d 469 (Mo. App. 1972). In
analyzing and criticizing interest analysis as applied to corporations, this Note will not consider the
Second Restatement approach except when it is being invoked as a proxy for interest analysis. For a
brief discussion of the application of this Note's critique to the Second Restatement, see infra note 77.
8. E. SCOLFS & P. HAY, supra note 3, § 2.6, at 17; Corr, supra note 6, at 653.
9. Juenger, Conflict of Laws, supra note 5, at 13-14; Reppy, supra note 6, at 647 & n.12. A
false conflict reveals itself when an examination of the underlying policies of facially conflicting laws
demonstrates that only one state has an interest in applying its law to the case. L. BRU.MAYER, Supra
note 3, at 235-36. In such a case, the conflict is only apparent, and the court can without difficulty
apply the law of the interested state. Id. The elimination of false conflicts reduces the number of cases
in which courts must choose between competing laws. Many scholars consider this feature to be inter-
est analysis' greatest achievement. J. MARTIN, PERSPECTIVES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS: CHoxcE OF
LAW 85 (1980); Ely, supra note 7, at 175-76, 195-96.
10. A true conflict exists if the first level examination of relevant state policies reveals that each
state has an interest in applying its law to the case. At this stage, a second level of analysis is required
to resolve the dispute. L. BRILMAYER, supra note 3, at 236-39. However, scholars generally agree
that no one has yet established a satisfactory way to resolve true conflicts. Ely, supra note 7, at 176;
von Mehren, Special Substantive Rules for Multistate Problems: Their Role and Signifwance in
Contemporary Choice of Law Methodology, 88 HARv. L. REV. 347, 365-66 (1974). The most-promi-
nent methods for resolving true conflicts include: "Currian" interest analysis, see B. CURRIE, supra
note 6, at 184 (apply forum law); Leflar's choice-influencing considerations, see Leflar, Choice-
Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 267 (1966) (apply law which best
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A. The Crucial Role of Domicile in Interest Analysis
Interest analysts view the scope of a state law in terms of the power of
a sovereign over its domiciliaries. 11 Domicile expresses the unique 2 rela-
tionship between an individual and a governmental unit."3 The domicile
concept is necessary to establish a person's legal headquarters so that his
or her legal status and various legal relationships can each be governed by
one law." The law of a person's domicile regulates marriage, divorce,
parent-child relationships, state taxes, voting rights, educational and
health care benefits, probate, and intestate succession.' 5
Interest analysis presupposes that each sovereign intends its laws to
benefit only its domiciliaries and not out-of-staters similarly situated.'"
For example, interest analysts believe that state legislatures design defend-
ant-protecting laws, such as contributory negligence or limitation of dam-
ages, to protect only in-state defendants." This protect-the-locals concep-
tion forms a crucial element of interest analysis, for it narrows the scope
of purportedly conflicting laws. Without such a mechanism to discount
state interests in non-local litigants, all apparent conflicts would be true
conflicts and interest analysis' primary achievement-the identification of
false conflicts'-would be diminished. 9 Despite viewing state laws as
secures justice based on five choice-influencing considerations); comparative impairment, see Baxter,
Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1963) (apply law of state whose policies
are most impaired if not applied); and the "most significant relationship" test, see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), supra note 2, at § 145 (apply law of state with most significant relationship to parties and
occurrence).
11. L. BRILMAYER, supra note 3, at 234.
12. Each person has only one domicile. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 2, at § 11(2). "If [a
person could have more than one domicile], the concept of domicile could not be used to select the state
*whose law governs certain of the person's important legal interests." Id. at § 11 comment m (citation
omitted).
13. Id. at § 11(1); E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 3, at § 4.1. For an account of the origin of
the concept of domicile, see Nygh, The Reception of Domicil into English Private International Law,
1 TASMANIAN U.L. REV. 555 (1961).
14. E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 3, at 4.1-4.3, 4.15. As Holmes stated, "what the law means
by domicile is the one technically pre-eminent headquarters, which as a result either of fact or of
fiction every person is compelled to have in order that by aid of it certain rights and duties which have
been attached to it by the law may be determined." Bergner & Engel Brewing Co. v. Dreyfus, 172
Mass. 154, 157, 51 N.E. 531, 532 (1898).
15. See E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 3, at § 4.1.
16. B. CURRIE, supra note 6, at 89, 270, 292, 417, 705, 724; see also L. BRILMAYER, Supra note
3, at 240; Ely, supra note 7, at 173-75, 196-97.
17. See, e.g., Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11 Cal.3d 574, 581, 522 P.2d 666, 670, 114 Cal. Rptr.
106, 111-12 (1974).
18. For the definition of "false conflict," see supra note 9.
19. See Ely, supra note 7, at 175-76 (interest analysis impotent without methodological premise
that states only interested in protecting their own); Reppy, supra note 6, at 647 n.12 ("lawmaker
chauvinism ('our law is just for the benefit of our domiciliaries') is thus the heart of interest analysis,
because without that approach, no false conflict could exist"). The central importance of this protect-
the-locals premise cannot be overemphasized. If a state with a plaintiff-protecting rule has an interest
in generating a victory for the plaintiff in a case regardless of the domicile of the plaintiff, then "all
states with any connection with the case must be counted as interested and . . . the case therefore
cannot be waved aside as involving a false or trivial conflict." Ely, supra note 7, at 178. On the other
hand, if interests were defined in terms of geographical location rather than domicile, the method
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protecting only local domiciliaries, though, interest analysts do not limit
state law protection territorially. Rather, the protection of state law "trav-
els" with the individual2" and may apply to a transaction in a foreign
state.
Interest analysts use domicile to assign litigants to particular states for
the purpose of determining relevant state interests. In the great majority
of cases, a court using interest analysis simply determines the domicile of
the plaintiff and the defendant and then assigns to each party the law of
that domicile in ascertaining each state's interest in applying its laws. 1
However, interest analysis theory fails to articulate rigorously the type or
level of contacts with a state needed to secure domiciliary status and thus
the protection of state laws.22 Consequently, interest analysis courts also
use residence,23 citizenship,2 ' and sometimes even employment within the
state25 as connecting factors to identify state protective interests. Interest
analysts draw no distinction between "domicile" and its cognates" in this
regard,28 because a state also has an interest in protecting persons with
those domicile-like contacts that express a persistent and unique relation-
ship with a state.
would constitute the functional equivalent of the territorialist First Restatement. Id. at 177. "Thus,
the only way the [interest analysis] system can operate ... is by assuming that states are interested in
applying their rules so as to generate victories for their own people in a way they are not interested in
generating victories for others." Id. at 178.
20. This feature of interest analysis is a variation on the medieval personal law principle, which
states that the law of a person's state follows and applies to the person's activities beyond that state.
See R. LEFLAR, L. McDOUGAL & R. FELIX, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAw 3-4 (1986); Guterman,
The Principle of the Personality of Law in the Early Middle Ages: A Chapter in the Evolution of
Western Legal Institutions and Ideas, 21 U. MIAMI L. REv. 259, 306-16 (1966). Interest analysts
consider the law of a person's domicile somewhat analogously to a personal law for the purpose of
determining the protective scope of a state's law and thus a state's interest. Tedmically, though, schol-
ars who identify interest analysis with the medieval personal law principle, see, e.g., Juenger, Conflict
of Laws, supra note 5, at 11-12, 39, are incorrect. The personal law principle was employed as a
jurisdiction-selecting method; the law of a person's home state applied to govern his or her personal
capacities, regardless of whether or not the law benefitted the local. See, e.g., R. LEFLAR, L. Mc-
DOUGAL & R. FELIX, supra, at 3; Guterman, supra, at 306-16. By contrast, interest analysis rejects
jurisdiction-selecting rules and purports to assess the actual substantive scope of the laws in question.
The concept of state interests works like a personal law only to the extent that the protection of a
state's law vests in the domiciliary for the purpose of analyzing competing state interests.
21. Juenger, What Now?, supra note 5, at 39; Reppy, supra note 6, at 647 n,11.
22. L. BRILMAYER, supra note 3, at 240; see also Ely, supra note 7, at 173 n.1 (Currie never
clarified "whether he meant to be talking about residence, domicile, citizenship, or 'the state to which
one belongs' "); Juenger, Conflict of Laws, supra note 5, at 39 (interest analysts unable to describe
with precision type of relationship between person and state necessary and suffic ent to activate gov-
ernmental interest).
23. See, e.g., Labree v. Major, 111 R.I. 657, 673, 306 A.2d 808, 817-18,(1973).
24. See, e.g., Baird v. Bell Helicopters Textron, 491 F. Supp. 1129, 1139, 1141 (N.D. Tex.
1980).
25. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313-14 (1981) (plurality opinion).
26. See, e.g., B. CURRIE, supra note 6, at 292 (benefits of wrongful death statute "should be made
available whenever those who are the objects of its protection are members of the community-i.e.,
residents or domiciliaries of the state") (emphasis added).
1989]
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 98: 597.
B. The Inapplicability of the Domicile Concept to Corporations
The domicile concept used by interest analysts applies most naturally to
persons." Most of the functions served by domicile with regard to persons
do not apply to corporations. 28 Corporations do not vote, divorce, or be-
queath property to their children. Although some issues governed by per-
sonal domicile, such as personal jurisdiction and the power to tax and to
regulate, are common to persons and corporations, a state derives its pow-
ers of adjudication and taxation over a corporation from business and in-
corporation contacts not related to domicile. s While courts3° and schol-
ars sometimes refer to the relationship between a corporation and its
state of incorporation as domicile, this attribution confounds corporate ac-
tivities with those of individuals.
2
27. Roman law first employed domicile as a concept akin to residence to govern municipal obliga-
tions and to establish personal jurisdiction of municipal courts. M. JACOBS, THE LAW O DOMICIL
§§ 1-12 (1887); Nygh, supra note 13, at 555-57. In Anglo-American jurisprudence, the concept of
domicile developed in England as a connecting factor employed to determine the law applicable to a
variety of personal transactions and relationships such as succession to personal and real property. Id.
at 565. It was later used to determine the law that governed personal status and capacities. Id. Schol-
ars disagree about whether the Anglo-American concept of domicile originated in English common
law or Roman civil law. See Francis, The Domicil of a Corporation, 38 YALE L.J. 335, 341 (1929).
Today, the concept continues to serve primarily to identify the law governing personal transactions
and relationships, especially family-oriented matters. See E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 3, at § 4.
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 2, at § 11 comment 1; E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra
note 3, at § 4.46.
29. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), supra note 2, at § 11 comment 1 ("it is both inaccurate and unnec-
essary to explain the existence of [the power to tax and to adjudicate] on the ground that the corpora-
tion has its domicil in the state of incorporation"). A minimum contacts analysis establishes both the
power to tax, see Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954), and the power to adjudi-
cate, see International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319-20 (1945), although the tax standard is
easier to satisfy, see L. BRILMAYER, supra note 3, at 397.
30. See, e.g., Baird v. Bell Helicopters Textron, 491 F. Supp. 1129, 1137 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
31. See, e.g., Romano, Law as Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. &
ORG.'225, 280 (1985).
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 2, at § 11 comment 1; H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER,
LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 153 (3d ed. 1983).
Domicile used to be more relevant in the corporate context than it is today. The First Restatement
provided that a corporation had its domicile in the place of its incorporation and could not acquire a
domicile in another state. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, at § 41. This view was grounded in the
contemporary American common law notion that a corporation lacked existence outside of the state of
its creation, although it could carry on business in other states. 1 J. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 228-29 (1935). See generally A. FARNSWORTH, THE RESIDENCE AND DOMICIL
OF CORPORATIONS 58-59, 269-70 (1939) (discussing early twentieth century American common law
views on corporate entity and corporate domicile). Even the First Restatement recognized that the
nature of a corporation precluded it from acquiring a home and thus a domicile of choice; but corpo-
rate domicile was viewed as a necessary fiction to regulate certain aspects of corporate activity. RE-
STATEMENT, supra note 3, at § 41 comment c. However, the rise of corporate entity theory, see
Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173
(1985), and the development of minimum contacts analysis, see cases cited supra note 29, rendered
irrelevant the concept of corporate domicile, as the Second Restatement eventually acknowledged, RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 2, at § 11 comment 1.
The legal realists were among the first to articulate the incoherence of assimilating corporations
into an individualistic domicile framework. See, e.g., W. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 207-10 (1942); Francis, supra note 27. It is therefore ironic that interest
analysts, whose intellectual roots are firmly grounded in legal realism, see Dane, Vested Rights, "Ves-
tedness,'" and Choice of Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1191, 1196-1201 (1987), have failed to grasp the prob-
lematic application of their domicile framework to corporations.
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Corporations by their nature do not fit well into the domiciliary frame-
work. Domicile has two elements: physical presence in a place33 and spe-
cific intent to make a home there,-" neither of which can be ascribed
neatly to a corporate entity. Corporations do not possess "presence" the
way people do. 35 The variety of corporate contacts with a state, such as
incorporation, principal place of business, and doing business, are less
tangible and more geographically dispersed than the contacts of a person
with a state.3" Moreover, the ascription of corporate intent raises problems
not found in the individual context.
37
Additionally, the domicile concept has an "all-or-nothing" character.3"
The model of a person having one and only one permanent and specific
residence correlates fairly well with reality.39 Corporations, however, do
not fit this model well, especially when they are incorporated in one state,
headquartered in another, have their principal place of business in a
third, manufacture products in several others, and do business in many
more states.
II. IGNORED CORPORATE CONTACTS THAT SHOULD TRIGGER
PROTECTIVE STATE INTERESTS
Interest analysis thus employs a concept of domicile that applies to indi-
viduals but not corporations. Domicile, though, is the contact that triggers
state interests. Thus, because corporate contacts with a
state-incorporation, principal place of business, and doing business-do
not give rise to the domiciliary status needed to implicate a state's interest,
interest analysis courts tend systematically to ignore or to attenuate state
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 2, at § 16.
34. Id. at § 18.
35. See, e.g., Thompson v. Horvath, 10 Ohio St. 2d 247, 251, 227 N.E.2d 225, 228 (1967) (cor-
poration, unlike real person, has no physical presence); 1 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW
OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7 (rev. perm. ed. 1980) (same); Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense
and the Functional Approach, 35 COLM. L. REv. 809, 811 (1935) ("[n]obody has ever seen a
corporation").
36. See R. LEFLAR, L. McDOUGAL & R. FEUx, supra note 20, at 29 ("any corporation can be
'present' in several different states for various purposes and ... the means of determining its 'pres-
ence' for different purposes are so variant that laying down a single body of rules for corporate
domicile is impossible").
37. See M. DAN-COHEN, supra note 4, at 32-38; see also T. DONALDSON, CORPORATIONS AND
MORALITY 21-23 (1982) (corporations act intentionally but lack analogue of individual intent); C.
STONE, supra note 4, at 3, 35 (questioning coherence of corporate "mind").
38. See supra note 12.
39. Some scholars argue that the purported uniqueness of personal domicile is increasingly a fic-
tion. See Corr, supra note 6, at 668-71; Corson, Reform of Domicile Law for Application to Tran-
sients, Temporary Residents and Multi-Based Persons, 16 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 327, 330
(1981); see also Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 428-32 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (increase
in mobility and intangible wealth undermines domicile assumption that individuals can be related to
single place). The fact that a person's domicile changes over time does not prevent it from being
unique at any particular moment. And even if the concept is increasingly fictional, it is still a neces-
sary Fiction required to govern personal status and transactions, see supra notes 14-15 and accompa-
nying text, which is irrelevant in the corporate context, see supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 98: 597'
interests in corporations.4" This Section analyzes the three types of corpo-
rate contacts with a state and demonstrates that courts have left corpora-
tions with these contacts out of the interest calculus.
41
A. State of Incorporation
The state of incorporation creates the corporate entity as an incident to
its sovereign powers. 42 In so doing, the state establishes a legal personality
capable of possessing rights and duties. Incorporation functions as a cru-
cial contact in numerous jurisdictional and conflict of law contexts. For
example, the law of the place of incorporation governs internal corporate
affairs.4 Moreover, corporations qualify as citizens of the state of their
incorporation for diversity jurisdiction purposes."' Finally, the courts of a
state can assert general personal jurisdiction over corporations incorpo-
rated in that state.45
The incorporation contact implicates many of the same state interests
that the domicile connecting factor captures for individuals. 48 Both an in-
dividual's and a corporation's legal personality-their "particular bundle
of rights, powers, privileges, and duties"-are creatures of state law."
The state of incorporation is thus a natural candidate to establish a per-
sonal protective law48 for a corporation, because it is the state that brings
40. As this Section will make clear, courts attenuate protective interests in corporations in a vari-
ety of ways. Most frequently, courts fail to recognize interests in corporations at all. Sometimes they
discuss a state's interest in imposing liability on a corporation, and in a very few cases they mention a
corporate-protecting interest but then proceed to discount it drastically. This Section attempts to ex-
plain and impose some structure on the variety of anti-corporate interest analysis decisions by showing
that they all arise from the skewed domicile schema into which corporations do not fit.
41. As argued infra notes 49-51, 65-66, 72 and accompanying text, these contacts implicate the
same concerns recognized by interest analysts in other contexts. However, because interest analysts
(surprisingly) fail to state what it is about being a domiciliary that implicates state interests, see Corr,
supra note 6, at 671; Ely, supra note 7, at 177, it would be impossible to prove conclusively by
analogy with the domicile contact that these corporate contacts always establish state interests. None-
theless, the point of this Section is that corporate contacts raise concerns in a state that are analogous
to those recognized for individuals, thus rendering unexplained and unjustified the exclusion of corpo-
rations from the interest calculus.
Additionally, the argument in this Section does not claim that corporate contacts taken alone war-
rant the application of the contact state's law. Rather, the Section shows that, according to interest
analysis principles, the contacts should give rise to interests to be considered in the overall interest
calculation. The focus is on interest identification and consideration, the necessary predicates to a
proper interest analysis. Interest analysts leave corporations out of this calculus without e-planation.
42. 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 35, at §§ 113-14.
43. See supra note 2.
44. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1982).
45. See Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REv. 610, 633 & n.111
(1987).
46. See R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 304 (1986) (state has inter-
est in applying its defendant-protecting laws to corporation incorporated in state). Currie once recog-
nized, without discussion, that states have legitimate interests in applying their protective tort laws to
corporations incorporated within the state. See B. CURRIE, supra note 6, at 704.
47. Reese & Kaufman, supra note 2, at 1122; see also Foley, Incorporation, Multiple Incorpora-
tion, and Choice of Law, 42 HARv. L. REv. 516, 518-19 (1929) ("[corporations] cannot, any more
than human beings, enter into legal relations unless enabled to do so by law").
48. For a discussion of the personal law principle as used in the interest analysis context, see
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the corporation into existence and initially ascribes the corporation with
personal capacities.49 The incorporation state also possesses instrumental
revenue interests in its corporations: Many states derive enormous finan-
cial benefits from incorporation franchise taxes5P and are interested in
protecting this revenue source.51
Although courts sometimes refer to a corporation's place of incorpora-
tion as its domicile, 52 they attenuate the significance of the law of the
place of incorporation in calculating relevant state interests. Some courts
fail even to mention the place of incorporation of corporate litigants, and
neither analyze the relevant policies underlying the laws of the incorpora-
tion states nor discern the ignored states' interests in applying their laws
to their corporations.
53
Other courts at least mention the places of incorporation, but fail to
consider the laws of those places in analyzing interests." For example, in
supra note 20.
49. In a purely domestic situation, a corporation would, as an incident of incorporation, be subject
to and deserve the benefit of the tort laws of the state of its incorporation just as would a domiciliary
individual. See 9 W. FLETCHER, supra note 35, at § 4255. The situation should be identical in the
interstate context; interest analysis presents no reason why a state would have an interest in applying
its protective tort laws to the foreign activity of one of its domiciliary individuals but not one of its
corporations.
50. For example, Delaware, the most popular state of incorporation, derived 16% of its total
revenues from incorporation franchise taxes in 1987. Labaton, Debate Over New Takeover Law, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 1, 1988, at D4, col. 3.
51. The various parties in the debate concerning the effects of competition among states for the
business of corporate charters agree that states strongly desire to "maximize revenues from corporate
chartering." Macey & Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65
TEX. L. REV. 469, 470 (1987). The incorporation debate concerns whether the financial and other
benefits that states receive are in exchange for providing corporate laws that are favorable to manage-
ment, see Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663,
665-66 (1974), or efficient, see R. WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATroN 28-42 (1978). A
state interested in providing favorable corporate laws in order to attract corporations and maximize
revenue should have a concomitant interest in applying its favorable tort laws to protect its corpora-
tions. This interest in protecting revenue sources and preventing revenue drain is well recognized by
interest analysts in other contexts. See infra notes 65-66, 72 and accompanying text; see also Corr,
supra note 6, at 653 (recognizing state of incorporation's interest in preventing large judgments
against its corporations).
52. See, e.g., Baird v. Bell Helicopters Textron, 491 F. Supp. 1129, 1137 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
53. See, e.g, Kaczmarek v. Allied Chem. Corp., 836 F.2d 1055 (7th Cir. 1987); Ambrose v. Illi-
nois-Calif. Express, Inc., 151 Ariz. 527, 729 P.2d 331 (1986); Schlemmer v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.,
292 Ark. 344, 730 S.W.2d 217 (1987); Wallis v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 261 Ark. 622, 550 S.W.2d
453 (1977); Mitchell v. United Asbestos Corp., 100 Il. App. 3d 485, 426 N.E.2d 350 (1981); Jagers
v. Royal Indem. Co., 276 So. 2d 309 (La. 1973); Fox v. Morrison Motor Freight, Inc., 25 Ohio St. 2d
193, 267 N.E.2d 405, cert. denied, 403 U.S. 931 (1971); Griffith v. United Air Lines, 416 Pa. 1, 203
A.2d 796 (1964); Zelinger v. State Sand & Gravel Co., 38 Wis. 2d 98, 156 N.W.2d 466 (1968).
54. Courts use a variety of methods to reduce the importance of the incorporation contact in
interest analysis cases. Some courts proclaim without discussion that a state has no interest in apply-
ing its laws to a corporation whose only contact with the state is incorporation. For example, in
Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 141, 305 A.2d 412, 418 (1973), a product liability case with
a statute of limitations choice of law issue, the New Jersey court stated-without explanation and
without examining the policies of the laws of New Jersey-that the incorporation contact of defendant
Uniroyal was insufficient to establish a New Jersey interest.
Other courts disclaim a state's interest in a corporation established under its laws because of the
purportedly adventitious nature of the incorporation contact. See Seiderman v. American Inst. for
Mental Studies, 667 F. Supp. 154, 158 (D.N.J. 1987) ("accident of having been incorporated in
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Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co.," a Rhode Island citizen filed a diversity suit
against Ford, incorporated in Delaware, to recover for the wrongful death
of his son arising from a car accident in Massachusetts. The First Circuit,
using an "interest weighing" approach, framed the choice of law issue
solely in terms of whether Massachusetts' limited wrongful death statute
or Rhode Island's more generous one would apply.5 In so doing, the
court failed to consider the relevant interests of Delaware, the state of
defendant's incorporation. If a Delaware domiciliary rather than a Dela-
ware corporation had been the defendant in a wrongful death action, an
interest analysis court would have considered the policies underlying Del-
aware's law in performing the interest analysis calculation.5 Incorpora-
tion in the state, however, did not warrant the implication of that state's
laws.58
B. Principal Place of Business
Federal law establishes that a corporation is also 59 a citizen, for pur-
poses of diversity jurisdiction, in the state of its "principal" place of busi-
ness.60 Corporations have one and only one principal place of business.6"
Courts have developed a number of tests to ascertain a corporation's prin-
cipal place of business, 2 but have a notoriously hard time doing so.63
Pennsylvania") (emphasis added); Estrada v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 488 A.2d 1359, 1362 n.6
(D.C. App. 1985) ("the court is struck by the fortuity of defendant's state of incorporation") (em-
phasis added); Deemer v. Silk City Textile Mach. Co., 193 N.J. Super. 643, 650, 475 A.2d 648,
651-52 (App. Div. 1984) (distinguishing previous case in which New Jersey did not possess "any
sufficient interest" in products liability action involving New Jersey corporation because "the only
New Jersey contact was chance incorporation of the defendant") (emphasis added). To the contrary,
though, the state of incorporation is not accidental. See Romano, supra note 31.
-55. 494 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1974).
56. Id. at 179.
57. See, e.g., Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 574, 581, 522 P.2d 666, 670, 114 Cal. Rptr.
106, 110 (1974) (en banc) (considering interests of defendant's domicile in wrongful death case). Cf
Labree v. Major, 111 R.I. 657, 673, 306 A.2d 808, 817-18 (1973) (looking to residence of both
parties).
58. See also Pearce v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 1490 (D.D.C. 1987); Burley v.
General Motors Corp., 650 F. Supp. 90 (D. Me. 1986); Camp v. Forwarders Transp., Inc., 537 F.
Supp. 636 (C.D. Calif. 1982); Lewis v. Chemetron Corp., 448 F. Supp. 211 (W.D. Pa. 1978);
Gordon v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Gravina v. Brunswick Corp.,
338 F. Supp. 1 (D.R.I. 1972); Johnson v. Hertz Corp., 315 F. Supp. 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Tiernan
v. Westext Transp., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1256 (D.R.I. 1969); Schwartz v. Consolidated Freightways
Corp., 300 Minn. 487, 221 N.W.2d 665 (1974); Oltarsh v. Aetna Ins. Co., 15 N.Y.2d 111, 204
N.E.2d 622, 256 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1965).
59. See supra text accompanying note 44.
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1982). In addition, a court in the state of a corporation's principal place
of business may assert general personal jurisdiction over the corporation. See Perkins v. Benguet Con-
sol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
61. See, e.g., Celanese Corp. of Am. v. Vandalia Warehouse Corp., 424 F.2d 1176, 1178 (7th
Cir. 1970).
62. Some courts follow the "nerve center" test, which focuses on the location of the executive and
administrative functions of the corporation, see, e.g., Philip Morris, Inc. v. Sun Leasing Co., 371 F.
Supp. 1233, 1234 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), while others employ the "center of operations" test, which em-
phasizes the production and service activity of the corporation, see, e.g., Kelly v. United States Steel
Corp., 284 F.2d 850, 853 (3d Cir. 1960). See generally C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS
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With regard to large multi-state corporations, the concept of a principal
place of business is often a fiction."
The state that qualifies as a corporation's principal place of business
should have an interest in that corporation's welfare. This contact implies
a continuous and ubiquitous relationship with a state that benefits numer-
ous state citizens both directly and indirectly, and should give rise to state
interests in protecting the economic well-being of a corporation as a means
toward regulating the state's economy, maximizing corporate tax reve-
nues, and protecting in-state employees and creditors.65 These interests
are grounded precisely in the kind of instrumental revenue concerns rec-
ognized by interest analysts in other contexts, such as preventing injured
victims from becoming public charges, providing for a compensation pool
for medical and other creditors, and preserving the integrity and economy
of the forum's judicial process."6 Nonetheless, without examination most
interest analysis courts either fail to disclose,67 or mention but ignore,"
104-05 (3d ed. 1976) (attempting to reconcile these two tests).
63. C. WRIGHT, supra note 62, at 104; Joiner, Corporations as Citizens of Every State Where
They Do Business: A Needed Change in Diversity Jurisdiction, 70 JUDICATURE 291, 293-94 (1987).
64. Kelly, 284 F.2d at 853 ("The concept may get artificial in some cases as indeed it is in the
case before us. This great corporation. . . has literally dozens of important places of business one of
which we must pick. . . because the statute says so.") (footnote omitted); C. WRIGHT, supra note 62,
at 104 (assumption of only one principal place of business for large corporations "highly unrealistic").
65. See In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, 644 F.2d 594, 614 (7th Cir.) ("California, as
does every state, has a substantial interest in the economic health of corporations which do business
within its borders.... California's interest is strong with regard to a rule disallowing punitive dam-
ages because such a rule protects the economic well-being of the corporations and therefore enhances
the economic well-being of the state .... ) (emphasis added), cert. denied sub nom. Lin v. American
Airlines, 454 U.S. 878 (1981); see also Schulhof v. Northeast Cellulose, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1200,
1206 (D. Mass. 1982) (state of principal place of business has interest in protecting its businesses
from large liability); Deemer v. Silk City Textile Mach. Co., 193 N.J. Super. 643, 651, 475 A.2d
648, 652 (App. Div. 1984) (attenuating New Jersey's interest in applying its anti-defendant products
liability law to corporatien conducting manufacturing activities in state because application of law
"would have the undesirable consequence of deterring the conduct of manufacturing operations in this
state and would likely result in an unreasonable increase in litigation and thereby unduly burden
[New Jersey's] courts"); Feldman v. Acapulco Princess Hotel, 137 Misc. 2d 878, 891-2, 520
N.Y.S.2d 477, 486 (1987) (Mexico's interest in protecting local hotel connected to interest in encour-
aging tourism and developing economy); cf. Symeonides, Revolution and Counter-Revolution in
American Conflicts Law: Is There a Middle Ground?, 46 OHIO ST. L. J. 549, 557 (1985) ("one
cannot deny seriously that a state like Michigan has a great deal at stake in a products liability action
against one of Michigan's auto industries").
66. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 319 (1981) (plurality opinion) (state interest in
keeping injured persons off welfare); B. CURRIE, supra note 6, at 61, 145 n.64, 150-51, 209-10,
701-02 (state interest in protecting local medical services and keeping indigents off welfare); R.
WEINTRAUB, supra note 46, at 304-07 ("forum. . . has an interest in preserving the integrity and
economy of its judicial process"); Brilmayer, Governmental Interest Analysis: A House Without
Foundations, 46 OHIO ST. L. J. 459, 470-71 (1985) (state interest in keeping w.tlfare bills as low as
possible); Corr, supra note 6, at 652-63 (state interest most easily identifiable when financial, espe-
cially when loss of tax revenues is an issue); Juenger, Conflict of Laws, supra note 5, at 13 (state
interest in protecting local creditors); Symeonides, supra note 65, at 559 (state interest in protecting
local medical creditors and preventing indigents from becoming public wards).
67. See, e.g., Pearce v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 1490 (D.D.C. 1987); Johnson v.
Hertz Corp., 315 F. Supp. 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Murphy v. Colorado Aviation, 41 Colo. App. 237,
588 P.2d 877 (1978); Mitchell v. United Asbestos Corp., 100 Ill. App. 3d 485, 426 N.E.2d 350
(1981).
68. See, e.g., Kaczmarek v. Allied Chem. Corp., 836 F.2d 1055 (7th Cir. 1987); Erickson v.
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the state of a corporation's principal place of business in calculating rele-
vant state interests.
C. Doing Business Within the State
Unlike the incorporation and principle place of business contacts, a cor-
poration may "do business" in many states. For reasons unrelated to in-
terest analysis,"9 the law draws an artificial distinction between a corpora-
tion's "exclusive" principal place of business and the numerous other
states in which a corporation "merely" does business. However, interest
analysis concerns itself with a juridical entity's particular contacts with a
state as a way of measuring that state's interest in applying its protective
laws. Thus, the artificial distinction between the state of a corporation's
principal place of business and the states in which a corporation does bus-
iness need not divide the field between interested and non-interested
states.
Although courts consider only one state as the corporation's principal
place of business,"0 this designation often does not reflect a significant dif-
ference between a corporation's principal place of business and other
places where it does business. 1 Consequently, both the principal place of
business and a state in which the corporation merely does business could
have similar interests in the corporation, for the difference in business, if
any, might be minimal. Indeed, a small state in which a corporation
"merely" does business could have a greater relative interest than a larger
state in which it carries on a greater absolute quantity of business. Also,
the state in which two corporations carry on equal levels of business activ-
ity could have a similar interest in each corporation, despite the fact that
the state is the principal place of business for one corporation but is
merely a place where the other larger corporation does business.
The doing business contact triggers a state's interest in a manner simi-
lar to the principal place of business contact, because it also implicates a
state's concern in regulating the state's economy, maximizing corporate
tax revenues, and protecting in-state employees and creditors.7 2 Interest
analysts, though, recognize the doing business contact in a wholly unprin-
cipled manner. In the overwhelming majority of cases," courts do not rec-
American Motors Corp., 683 F. Supp. 644 (E.D. Mich. 1987); Burley v. General Motors Corp., 650
F. Supp. 90 (D. Me. 1986); Camp v. Forwarders Transp., Inc., 537 F. Supp. 636 (C.D. Cal. 1982);
Tiernan v. Westext Transp., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1256 (D.R.I. 1969); Wallis v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co.,
261 Ark. 622, 550 S.W.2d 453 (1977); Hampshire v. Ford Motor Co., 155 Mich. App. 143, 399
N.W.2d 36 (1986); Griffith v. United Air Lines, 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
69. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
70. But see supra note 64 (suggesting fictional nature of this judicial rule).
71. See id.
72. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
73. In rare cases, courts recognize that the doing business contact implicates a state's protective
interests. See In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La., 821 F.2d 1147, 1177 (5th Cir. 1987)
("Louisiana has an interest in protecting not just its own resident-defendants but also entrepreneurs
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ognize the protective interests of states in which a corporation does busi-
ness.7 Sometimes, a forum court will use corporate business activity
within the forum state as a justification for applying liability-imposing
forum law, but will refuse to recognize the protective interests of other
states within which the corporation does business.
75
III. INTEREST ANALYSIS UNDERMINED
Interest analysis therefore fails to recognize state interests in protecting
corporations. The domicile-based protect-the-locals orientation at the
heart of interest analysis leaves a corporation without any interested
state,"e because even the most plausible corporate contacts-incorporation,
principal place of business, and doing business-do not constitute the
domiciliary status that implicates protective state interests. Corporate liti-
gants as a class thus tend to be left out of the interest calculation, an
unexplained result which is facially unfair and which has no justification
within interest analysis theory.
77
doing business in its state"); In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, II1., 644 F.2d 594, 614 (7th
Cir.) cert. denied sub nom. Lin. v. American Airlines, 454 U.S. 878 (1981); Karavokiros v. Indiana
Motor Bus Co., 524 F. Supp. 385, 387 n.1 (E.D. La. 1981) (recognizing Louisiana's interest in.
protecting defendants who do business within state); cf. Beasock v. Dioguardi Enter., Inc., 100
A.D.2d 50, 52, 472 N.Y.S.2d 798, 801 (1984) (recognizing New York's interest in applying its law
prohibiting punitive damages in survival actions to "promote commerce within the state" by protecting
out of state as well as resident defendants from excessive liability). In even these rare cases, courts fail
to carry their insight to its logical conclusion: If corporate business in a state gives rise to an interest of
that state in applying its laws, then no principled reason exists for not considering the relevant laws
and interests of every state in which the corporation does significant business.
74. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 67-68.
75. For example, in DeRemer v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 353 N.W.2d 694 (Minn.
App. Ct. 1984), Minnesota plaintiffs brought a personal injury suit in Minnesota against a Nevada
corporation for injuries sustained in an accident in South Dakota involving defendant's driver. The
Minnesota Court of Appeals construed the choice of law issue as between Minnesota's comparative
negligence law and South Dakota's contributory negligence law. As one justification for Minnesota's
"clear governmental interest" in applying its plaintiff-benefiting law, the court stated: "[Diefendant
corporation, although foreign to Minnesota, is licensed to do business in this state and exercises this
privilege." Id. at 696. See also Hime v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 284 N.W.2d 829, 832 (Minn.
1979) (recognizing as reason to impose liability that corporate defendant "is licensed to do business in
Minnesota and is subject to suit in our courts," but ignoring laws of other states in which corporation
did business), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1032 (1980); Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 43, 47
(Minn. 1978) (recognizing as reason to impose liability "defendant's license to do business, and de-
fendant's conduct of business in the state," but ignoring laws of other states in which corporation did
business), affd, 449 U.S. 302 (1981). The DeRemer court considered certification to do business in its
state as one justification for ignoring the relevant laws of other states. In contrast, though, an individ-
ual's presence in a foreign state would not constitute a reason to ignore the interests of the individual's
domicile, because the protection of that law would be preserved in a foreign juisdiction. Moreover,
the DeRemer decision fails to explain why doing business in the forum state justifies the forum's
interest in applying its law to the exclusion of the law of every other state in which the corporation
does business. "Doing business" might give rise to the injection of an interest in applying local law
into the total interest calculation, but no principled reason exists for ignoring the relevant policies of
the other states in which the corporation also does business.
76. For minor exceptions to this general truism, see cases cited supra notes 65 & 73. While these
rare cases recognize that one type of corporate contact implicates a state interest, they ignore the
interests of states with other equally relevant corporate contacts. See id.
77. In contrast, both the vested rights approach of the First Restatement and some applications of
the "most significant relationship" test of the Second Restatement reach choice of law solutions
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This Section reconsiders interest analysis in light of the method's exclu-
sion of corporations. Three fundamental difficulties appear. First, interest
analysis cannot both accommodate corporate-protecting interests and solve
choice of law problems that arise from this accommodation. Second, the
anti-corporate bias inherent in interest analysis invariably leads to the se-
lection of the law that maximally imposes corporate liability. Finally, the
failure of the domicile connecting factor to reflect state interests in the
corporate context undermines the core assunfption of interest analysis.
A. Proliferation of True Conflicts
As currently practiced, interest analysis does not consider corporate con-
tacts in identifying protective state interests."8 The discrimination against
corporations can only be resolved by including corporations in the interest
calculus.1 9 This in turn leads to a proliferation of relevant interests in
interest analysis cases involving corporations.
through principles that are neutral as between individuals and corporations. The First Restatement
generally directs a court to look to the law of the place where the legal rights in question vest. L.
BRILMAYER, supra note 3, at 220. In tort cases, this means the law of the place where the injury
occurs. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, at §§377-397. If a person is injured in state X, the law of state
X applies regardless of the nature of the litigant (individual or corporation) or of the litigant's affilia-
tion with particular states. Thus, the First Restatement's focus on the place where the injury occurred
is truly neutral between individuals and corporations.
The Second Restatement uses a "most significant relationship" test. REsTA-rTEMENT (SECOND),
supra note 2, at § 145. This test requires a court in a choice of law case involving torts to apply the
.law of the state which has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties. Id. at §
145(1). The test is difficult to apply, for it combines almost antithetical considerations. A court must
,take into account the territorial contact points of Section 145, id. at § 145(2), in applying the general
policy principles of Section 6, id. at § 6. As a result, the Second Restatement is an extraordinarily
malleable document that the courts have used in radically different ways. Thus, courts invoke the
Second Restatement to perform interest analysis, see, e.g., Murphy v. Colorado Aviation, 41 Colo.
App. 237, 242,588 P.2d 877, 880 (1978); to break true conflicts generated by interest analysis, see,
e.g., Erwin v. Thomas, 264 Or. 454, 506 P.2d 494 (1973); as a jurisdiction-selecting method, see, e.g.,
Permagrain Prods. v. U.S. Mat & Rubber Co., 489 F. Supp. 108, 111 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1980); and as a
vehicle for eclecticism, see, e.g., -General Elec. Co. v. Keyser, 275 S.E.2d 289, 295 (W. Va. 1981)
(Second Restatement interpreted as hybrid of territorialism and Leflar's five factor test). See generally
Reppy, supra note 6, at 655-66 (discussing eclecticism bred by Second Restatement). Because the
Second Restatement lends itself to such various uses, generalizations about its treatment of corpora-
tions cannot easily be made. To the extent that courts rely on interest analysis concepts in emphasiz-
ing the policy factors of Section 6, the Second Restatement suffers from the same difficulties as interest
analysis. See, e.g., Mitchell v. United Asbestos Corp., 100 I1. App. 3d 485, 426 N.E.2d 350 (1981).
To the extent that courts rely on Section 145 as a territorialist jurisdiction-selecting method, the
Second Restatement tends to eliminate problems of unfairness against corporations in a manner simi-
lar to the First Restatement. See, e.g., Permagrain Prods. v. U.S. Mat & Rubber Co., 489 F. Supp.
108 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
78. But see supra note 76.
79. Each of the corporate contacts discussed above gives rise to similar state concerns. See supra
notes 49-51, 65-66, 72 and accompanying text. All three contacts affect state revenues in a manner
that does not allow for a principled distinction. See id. While the incorporation contact might affect
state financial interests less than the other two contacts, it more closely resembles the notion underly-
ing the personal law principle. See supra text accompanying notes 48-49. And while the principal
place of business contact often implicates more serious revenue interests than a state in which the
corporation does business, the difference need not be significant. See text accompanying notes 71-72.
Thus, recognition of one contact as a trigger of state protective interests requires recognition of all
three.
Interest Analysis
This potential proliferation of interests defeats the one recognized
achievement of interest analysis: the identification of false conflicts that
allow the unproblematic application of the law of the only "interested"
state.80 Recognition of the plethora of corporate-protecting interests in the
corporate context would imply that courts rarely, if ever, discover a false
conflict, because at least one state in which a corporation does business
would probably have a corporate-protecting rule. Courts would therefore
have to resort to the various second-order techniques 1 used in resolving
true conflicts, techniques considered by many to be as problematic as the
methodology of the traditional vested rights approach. 82 Currently, courts
avoid this proliferation of interests and the intractable true conflicts that
follow only by suppressing state interests in protecting corporations.
Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co.83 illustrates the incoherence
into which interest analysis courts fall. In Offshore, plaintiff corporation
brought suit against defendant corporation to recover for the loss-of ser-
vices of a key employee negligently injured on defendant's premises in
Louisiana. Plaintiff was incorporated in California and maintained its
principal place of business there, but did significant business in Louisiana
and elsewhere; defendant was incorporated in Delaware, headquartered in
New York, and did business in Louisiana, California and elsewhere. Cali=
fornia law allowed recovery, Louisiana law denied it."' In making the
crucial identification of each corporate litigant with a particular state, the
court identified California as the plaintiff's "home" and Louisiana as the
80. See Ely, supra note 7, at 176.
81. See supra note 10.
82. See id. The proliferation of corporate-protecting interests creates resolution difficulties that
are significantly more intractable than the traditional two-state true conflict. With large corporate
litigants, the interests of up to fifty states could be implicated. Not only is the research, identification,
and measurement of dozens of interests impracticable, but any resolution of these many conflicting
interests will be unsatisfactory. Cf Miller & Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate
Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 YALE L.J. 1, 64-66 (1986) (discussing
enormous difficulty for judges "of organizing and following fifty or more different bodies of complex
substantive principles" in nationwide class action choice of law disputes).
For example, in System Operations, Inc. v. Scientific Games Dev. Corp., 555 F.2d 1131, 1137-38
(3rd Cir. 1977), the court acknowledged that the states in which the corporate litigants did business as
well as their principal places of business all had "substantial interest[s] in having their respective laws
of product disparagement applied." The court despaired in the face of its choice of law task: "Given
the facts of this case,... a New Jersey court would be hard pressed to single out any one state as
having the most significant interest in having its law applied." Id. at 1138.
Judge Weinstein, faced with the analogous difficulty of ascertaining and analy.!ing the numerous
state interests in the Agent Orange litigation, stated: "Any narrow and mechanical state choice of law
system simply collapses under the weight of the multiplicity of contacts, policies ahd unarticulated or
conflicting state interests .... There is no rational method by which a state could choose one state's
law to govern some or all of the issues in the case .... In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580
F. Supp. 690, 703, 706 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
83. 22 Cal. 3d 157, 583 P.2d 721, 148 Cal: Rptr. 867 (1978).
84. The laws of the two states differed on the question of whether a corporation could maintain
an action for damages arising out of personal injury to one of its employees. 22 Cal. 3d at 160, 583
P.2d at 723, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
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defendant's. The court went on to find a true conflict and, using a com-
parative impairment break device, 5 applied the law of Louisiana.
The interesting aspect of Offshore concerns not the final choice of law
but rather the method of locating corporate parties for purposes of deter-
mining interests. 8 True to its domicile presuppositions, the court "lo-
cated" each corporate party in only one state. Plaintiff apparently was
assigned to California not because it was incorporated there, but rather
because California was its principal place of business.8" Defendant, on the
other hand, was assigned to Louisiana by locating it at the site of its cor-
porate division that became involved in the litigation. The court offers no
explanation for this arrangement of litigant/state identifications. In par-
ticular, it does not explain why: (a) California counts as plaintiff's home
because of the principal place of business contact and yet defendant's prin-
cipal place of business is ignored; (b) Louisiana counts as defendant's
home state because of its business within the state, but plaintiff's business
there does not give rise to a similar identification; (c) the dozens of other
states in which both corporate litigants do business are ignored; or (d) the
place of incorporation is insignificant in the interest calculation. The
court, seemingly bound by the one party/one state domicile rule, appears
to have made its identification ad hoc. It narrowed the field of interested
states in a way that allowed for a manageable resolution of the conflict,
but only by making unprincipled corporation-state identifications, and by
ignoring, without explanation, states that were at least as interested as
those recognized. 8
85. Comparative impairment analysis resolves true conflicts by considering "which states' interest
would be more impaired if its policy were subordinated to the policy of the other state." 22 Cal. 3d at
165, 583 P.2d at 726, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 872. See generally Baxter, supra note 10 (explaining theoret-
ical underpinnings of comparative impairment doctrine).
86. See Reppy, supra note 6, at 672 n.133.
87. The court observed that no party had urged application of Delaware law even though Dela-
ware was the state in which defendant was incorporated. Offshore, 22 Cal. 3d at 161 n.2, 583 P.2d at
723 n.2., 148 Cal. Rptr. at 869 n.2. "The parties and the court apparently agreed that a corporate
litigant should not, for purposes of interest analysis, be located in a state merely because it is incorpo-
rated there." Reppy, supra note 6, at 672 n.133. Since incorporation was deemed insignificant, the
identification of the plaintiff with California must have been based on the principal place of business
contact. Although the parties in Offshore failed to urge the application of the law of Delaware as
defendant's state of incorporation, the court would have considered Delaware's interests if it viewed
them as relevant, for as the court said, "we make our own determination of ... policies and inter-
ests" independently of the litigants suggestions. The court gave no independent reason for its refusal
to consider Delaware law. Offshore, 22 Cal. 3d at 163 n.5, 583 P.2d at 725 n.5, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 871
n.5.
88. Offshore is a relatively unusual choice of law torts case because it involves a corporate plaintiff
as well as a corporate defendant. In a case of this kind, a court performing interest analysis will
necessarily find an interest that benefits one of the corporate litigants. As Offshore shows, courts can
find this interest only by identifying parties with states in an unprincipled and tendentious manner.
However, Offshore does not exhaust the possibilities for distortion in cases in .which all litigants are
corporations. For example, in Eastern Refractories Co. v. Forty Eight Insulations, Inc., 658 F. Supp.
197 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), an action between corporate litigants sounding in negligence and strict liabilty,
the court stated that it would apply the law of the jurisdiction of "greatest interest" and would con-
sider as significant connecting factors the parties' domiciles and the locus of the tort. Id. at 200.
However, even after perfunctorily reciting the principal place of business and place of incorporation of
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As Offshore shows, interest analysis cannot simultaneously adhere to its
domicile premise and treat corporations in a principled manner. Interest
analysis is impaled on the horns of a destructive dilemma: It can generate
false or relatively small conflicts only by distorting legitimate state inter-
ests in corporations, which is unfair to corporations and antithetical to its
own premises, or it can recognize these more ubiquitous state interests in
corporations, but only at the cost of generating unresolvable controversies.
B. The Law of Maximum Corporate Liabili ty
In systematically failing to recognize corporate-protecting interests, in-
terest analysis frequently leads to the choice and application of the law
which imposes maximum corporate liability. 9 With the aid of liberal per-
sonal jurisdiction laws90 and the Klaxon doctrine, 1 plaintiffs sue corpora-
tions in interest analysis fora with pro-plaintiff laws.92 Because corporate-
protecting interests are not recognized, corporate liability follows.'"
each of the corporate litigants, the court ignored these connecting factors and failed to consider which
state, if any, might be interested in protecting any of the plaintiff or defendant corporations. Instead,
without analysis the court applied the law of Florida, the state of injury. See also Morgan Guaranty
Trust Co. v. Garrett Corp., 625 F. Supp. 752 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (failing to consider any interests of
numerous states in which both plaintiff and defendant corporations had various ,contacts; focusing
exclusively on interests of states in which two decedents were domiciliaries but deciding in accordance
with law of place of injury).
89. See, e.g., Gore v. Northeast Airlines, 373 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1967) (applying New York's
limitless wrongful death statute rather than Massachusetts' limited one); DeRemer v. Pacific Inter-
mountain Express Co., 353 N.W.2d 694 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (applying Minnesota's comparative
negligence rather than South Dakota's contributory negligence rule); Pfau v. Trent Aluminum Co., 55
N.J. 511, 263 A.2d 129 (1970) (refusing to apply Iowa's guest statute).
90. The power of a state to assert personal jurisdiction over a party has expanded greatly since
the articulation of the "minimum contacts" standard in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310 (1945). The period following International Shoe has been marked by a proliferation of
longarm statutes and a generally permissive trend in due process regulation of personal jurisdiction.
See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
Although the Supreme Court has delineated the outer limits of the aisertion of personal jurisdiction,
see Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987); World Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), the minimum contacts test still provides a plaintiff with a
large choice of fora in multistate cases.
91. A federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction is required to apply the choice of law rules of
the state in which it sits. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
92. Shreve, Interest Analysis as Constitutional Law, 48 OHtO ST. L. J. 51, 59 (1987) ("Choice-
of-law-motivated forum shopping [has grown] in proportion to the increase in the number of courts
jurisdictionally competent to hear the same case.").
93. Usually, plaintiffs seek interest analysis courts in states with favorable law, which the forum
applies. Application of pro-forum law was encouraged by the Supreme Court's decision in Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981), which held that a state's decision to apply its substantive law
is unconstitutional only if the aggregation of the parties, the occurrence, and tht state renders arbi-
trary or fundamentally unfair the choice of that state's law. Most scholars believe Hague eliminates
any serious constitutional constraints on choice of law. See, e.g., R. WEINTRA'B, supra note 46,
§9.2A, at 525. It remains to be seen whether" the Supreme Court holding in Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822 (1985), that the application of forum law to all claims in a complex multis-
tate class action in which 98% of the litigants had no contact with the forum was "sufficiently arbi-
trary and unfair as to exceed constitutional limits," represents a heightened scrutiny in constitutional
limits on choice of law. See R. WEINTRAuB, supra note 46, § 9.2A, at 527-29. But cf Sun Oil Co. v.
Wortman, 108 S. Ct. 2117 (1988) (Kansas did not exceed constitutional limitations on choice of law
by applying its own statute of limitations to claims of residents of other states).
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Moreover, the failure to recognize corporate-protecting interests creates
a gap that allows for the injection of extraneous anti-corporate factors into
the interest calculus. This occurs most blatantly when a court "discovers"
an anti-corporate state interest in what would normally be a classic "no
interest"94 or "unprovided-for" 95 case. For example, in Wuerffel v. West-
inghouse Corp.," a New Jersey plaintiff sued Drexel University, a Penn-
sylvania not-for-profit corporation, for an injury that occurred in New
Jersey under a program sponsored by the defendant. New Jersey had a
pro-defendant charitable immunity statute; Pennsylvania did not. The
case thus should have presented a classic "no interest" case, because under
the standard protect-the-locals orientation, New Jersey had no interest in
applying its pro-defendant law to protect a Pennsylvania defendant, and
Pennsylvania had no interest in applying its pro-plaintiff law to protect a
New Jersey plaintiff. Nonetheless, the court applied the Pennsylvania law
because of "Pennsylvania's interest in demanding accountability of its cor-
porations. '9 7 The court thus ignored the protect-the-locals philosophy and
construed the scope of Pennsylvania's law differently than it would have
in the individual context because of a special interest in imposing liability
on corporations.98
Several factors-all irrelevant from an interest analysis perspec-
tive-help to explain this extra layer of anti-corporate bias. First, courts
sometimes tacitly assume that corporations are less "real" than persons
and thus do not deserve similar protection of state laws.99 Corporations
94.
The classic 'no interest' case is one in which the plaintiff's state has a law favorable to the
defendant and the defendant's state has a law favorable . . . to the plaintiff. The term 'no
interest' comes from the argument that neither state is interested in having its own law apply.
The plaintiff's state has no interest in protecting the defendant who comes from another state
and the defendant's state has no reason to give the plaintiff more compensation than he would
get under the law of his own state.
R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 46, § 6.23 at 333.
95. See B. CURRIE, supra note 6, at 152.
96. 148 N.J. Super. 327, 372 A.2d 659 (1977).
97. 148 N.J. Super. at 335; 372 A.2d at 663.
98. See also Gravina v. Brunswick Corp., 338 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.R.I. 1972) (recognizing, in what
should have been classic no interest case, Illinois' interest in applying its privacy laws to impose
liability on Illinois corporation); Kaiser-Georgetown Community Health Plan, Inc. v. Stutsman, 491
A.2d 502, 509-10 (D.C. App. 1985) (in what should have been classic no interest case, applying
District of Columbia's malpractice law to impose liability on District of Columbia corporation because
of District's "significant interest ... in holding corporations liable for the full extent of the negli-
gence"); Johnson v. Spider Staging Corp., 87 Wash. 2d 577, 583, 555 P.2d 997, 1002 (1976) (impos-
ing liability on Washington corporation in what should have been classic unprovided-for-case because
Washington's "legitimate interest" in "full compensation is clearly advanced by the application of its
own [limitless wrongful death statute]").
99. Although the nature of the corporate entity has long been subject to debate, see Horwitz,
supra note 32, at 173 (discussing historical debate over corporate form); Comment, The Personifica-
tion of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CH. L. REV. 1441 (1987), it is generally
recognized today that corporations are entities capable of bearing rights and duties. See M. DAN-
COHEN, supra note 4, at 14 & n.8 (corporate entity theory debate won by realists); see also id. at
13-25 ("organizational revolution" in the last 100 years has displaced traditional nineteenth century
view of corporations, requiring new cognitive structures to incorporate modern corporate reality);
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also seem less deserving of state law protection because they cannot par-
ticipate in the formation of these laws through voting."' 0 Finally, modern
tort law trends reinforce this tendency to impose liability on corporations
by viewing them as deep pockets and efficient risk-spreaders. 101 Indeed,
several scholars in the interest analysis tradition have called directly for
reliance on state-transcendent tort law trends to spread losses on deep
pocket defendants.102
These factors might separately or in conjunction constitute a plausible
basis for choice of law. For example, a choice of law rule that applies the
law of the state that maximally imposes corporate liability could legiti-
mately be grounded in arguments about political fairness or social equal-
ity. However, the basis for such choice of law rules differs dramatically
from the foundational philosophy of interest analysis-respect for sover-
eign state interests.103 To the extent that interest analysts embrace such
tacit assumptions and such explicit liability-imposing choice of law rules,
they have rejected their own first principles.
Comment, supra (detailing rise of corporate personality and autonomy); cf. Garret, Communality and
Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. Rav. 1001 (1983) (arguing that moral and legal
rights of corporations have foundation independent of rights of individuals or society).
100. However, to the extent that a state's interest in applying its protective law is a function of
the burdens assumed by its subjects, this assumption may be fallacious. The scope of a law's protec-
tion is not limited to those who participated in its creation. See Brilmayer, Shaping and Sharing in
Democratic Theory: Towards a Political Philosophy of Interstate Equality, 15 FLA. ST. U.L. Rv
389, 411 (1987). If the benefits of a law were limited to those who participated in its passage, then
the basis of state coercion over outsiders-that one who receives the benefits of law must also bear its
burdens-would be undercut. Id. Professor Brilmayer attempts to use this argument to undermine
(among other things) the general unfairness of the interest analysis protect-the-locals orientation, in
which outsiders bear the burdens of state law but not all of its benefits. The analysis can be applied to
corporations in a different way: Although outsiders in the sense of being excluded from the electoral
process, corporations are still subject to the burdens of state law, and thus should also receive its
benefits and protection. Moreover, corporations do participate in law formation through means other
than voting, such as political contributions, see, e.g., Epstein, PACS and the Modern Political Pro-
cess, in THE IMPACT OF THE MODERN CORPORATION 399 (B. Block, ed. 1984), and threats of
relocation, see, e.g., Current Topic, Sports Franchise Relocation: Competitive Markets and Taxpayer
Protection, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 429 (1988) (authored by John D. Beisner).
101. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977). A glance at recent state
tort reform legislation suggests that this liability-maximizing tendency is in reverse. See Priest, The
Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1587-88 & nn. 257-62.
102. See, e.g., R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 46, § 6.4, at 284-85 (advodating law which best dis-
tributes losses); Morrison, Death of Conflicts, 29 VILL. L. REv. 313, 338 (1983) (advocating choice of
"more fully compensating tort law"); Sedler, The Governmental Interest Approacii to Choice of Law:
An Analysis and a Reformulation, 25 UCLA L. Rav. 181, 235 (1977) (advocating use of common
state policies promoting recovery in unprovided-for-tort-cases); Weinburg, On Departing From Fo-
rum Law, 35 MERCER L. REv. 595, 624 (1985) (advocating reliance on policies favoring risk spread-
ing and compensation).
The reliance by these scholars on state-transcendent tort law trends to impose liabilty on deep
pocket defendants seems contradictory in light of the fact that current state tort law trends are moving
sharply in the direction of limiting liability. See Priest, supra note 101, at 1587-88 & nn. 257-62.
103. See Brilmayer, supra note 7, at 399 ("abiding purpose of [interest analysis] is case-by-case
implementation of state policies").
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C. State Interests Not Reflected in Corporate Context
Interest analysis purports to replace the abstract rules of the traditional
method that failed to consider legitimate state interests with a more realis-
tic approach that takes into account the various competing state policies at
issue. 04 Interest analysis theory assumes that the domicile contact some-
how accurately triggers a state's interest in a matter. However, the domi-
cile orientation at the heart of interest analysis almost always leads courts
to recognize state interests only in protecting local persons and is inher-
ently incapable of cognizing the variety of interests different states have in
protecting corporations.
Interest analysis is successful only to the extent that the connecting fac-
tors on which it relies truly reflect state interests. This is the rationale
upon which the entire system rests.1 05 If the types of contacts recognized
in determining state law protection fail to reflect each state's interest in a
particular matter-as with corporations-the primary justification for in-
terest analysis is undercut and the system is no longer tenable."0 6
CONCLUSION
The scheme within which interest analysis identifies state interests is
grounded in assumptions about persons that do not apply to corporations.
Because corporations do not assimilate well into interest analysis' central
domicile framework, interest analysis as currently practiced ignores a va-
riety of state interests in protecting corporations. The refusal to recognize
corporate-protecting interests has no justification within interest analysis
theory, and leads courts to consider anti-corporate factors that should be
irrelevant. Moreover, recognition of corporate-protecting interests reveals
difficulties that violate the methodology's foundational principles. Thus,
the application of interest analysis to corporate entities proves to be the
reductio ad absurdum of the method.1"'
104. Id. at 392.
105. See Corr, supra note 6, at 654 (link between domicile or residence and state interests is
"pivot on which interest analysis usually turns ... the linkage [between domicile and state interests]
has become so strong that the relationship between [them] seems to have fused the two concepts into a
single entity").
106. The selection of a single contact for corporations-for example the place of incorpora-
tion-as a proxy for domicile will not address this difficulty. While the arbitrary selection of just one
corporate contact as the trigger of protective state interests might preclude many of the multiple-
interest logistical problems that arise from applying interest analysis to corporations, see supra notes
78-82, and accompanying text, it would do so only at the price of severing the connection between
triggering contact and protective interest that lies at the heart of interest analysis.
107. For a brief discussion of the application of this Note's critique to the methodologies of the
First and Second Restatements, see supra note 77.
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